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Weatherill (eds), The Image(s) of the ‘Consumer’ in EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2016) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter surveys the images of the consumer drawn within the sphere of EU 
competition law and seeks to provide an underlying explanation for the variety of 
images drawn. It also elucidates the rationale for the different meanings ascribed to 
the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer welfare’ in the competition law context as 
compared to that adopted in the consumer law context. 
 The competition provisions in the TFEU make several express references to 
‘consumers’1 without defining the term.2 Further, a number of allusions to the 
consumer can be found in the jurisprudence, secondary legislation and, most 
specifically, the Commission’s guidance documents. These sources (legislation, case 
law, decisional practice and Commission Guidelines) suggest, at first sight, that, as is 
the case in other areas of EU law, the image of the consumer painted by the law is not 
a uniform or monochrome one, but a colourful one, evoking a landscape of diversity. 
Indeed, these sources variously refer to, or distinguish between, for example: 
‘consumers’ and ‘individual consumers’,3 ‘direct and indirect users of the products’,4 
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1
 There are three specific references to the consumer in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(‘TFEU’) competition law provisions: see Art 101(3), Art 102(b) and, in the context of the state aid 
provisions, Art 107(2)(a) which lists ‘aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers’ as 
one of the forms of aid automatically compatible with EU Law.  
2
 Apart from the reference to ‘individual’ consumers in Art 107(2)(a) TFEU (as distinguished from the 
reference to consumers in a generic sense in Arts 101 and 102), the Treaty does not offer a definition of 
consumer for the purposes of EU Competition Law. This is not uncommon in EU law. Many key 
concepts in the Treaty, eg the notions of ‘worker’ in Art 45 TFEU, and ‘undertaking’ in the context of 
the competition provisions themselves are not defined. In many cases, the case law has filled these 
gaps. See for instance, for the definition of worker, Case 53/81 DM Levin v Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, para 17 and undertaking, Case C–41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v 
Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I–1979, para 21 where the Court held that an undertaking constitutes 
‘every entity engaged in economic activities, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in 
which it is financed’. In other cases, the task of giving meaning to undefined concepts has been 
performed by secondary legislation. For example, consumer protection directives have often defined 
the consumer as a ‘natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft 
or profession’ (see Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011 on Consumer Rights, [2011] OJ L 304/64, Art 2(1)). A common thread that has emerged from 
this exercise, however, has been that the meaning attributed to these concepts, whilst obviously 
inspired in the national legal systems, has a distinct and characteristic EU identity. This has not really 
happened in reference to the concept of consumer in EU competition law. 
3
 See the references to the wording of Art 107(2) (a) TFEU and that of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU (n 2). 
4
 See the Commission Guidelines on the application of Art 81(3) [now Art 101(3) TFEU] of the Treaty 
(the ‘Art 101(3) Guidelines’) [2004] OJ C 101/97, para 84.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2750922 
 
 
‘professional end users and final consumers’,5 ‘intermediate and ultimate 
consumers’,6 ‘customers and consumers’,7 ‘competitors, consumers’ and ‘final 
consumers’8 and ‘individual undertakings and consumers’.9 
 This chapter considers this diversity of images and argues that although some 
loose and inconsistent language is sometimes deployed, when the apparently differing 
approaches are set within the broader context in which they are used, and against the 
overarching goals of EU Competition law, it can be seen that the interpretations 
adopted in each scenario are not in fact inconsistent with one another. Rather, the 
question of how the consumer is characterised and defined in the competition law 
sphere is dependent upon the context and the part of the competition law process in 
which it is used. In particular, the meaning of the term ‘consumer’ adopted fluctuates 
depending upon whether it is used in the context of: (i) describing the objectives of 
the competition laws and the consumers that those competition law rules are designed 
to protect; (ii) identifying persons during the process of determining whether the 
competition law rules have been infringed and, consequently, their objectives 
thwarted: for example, when deploying analytical tools or identifying whether 
particular persons, or groups of persons, have been harmed or benefited by the 
conduct at issue; or (iii) referring to some of the actors who participate in the 
enforcement of the substantive competition provisions. 
Before focussing on the specific references to consumers that have been 
adopted in the legislation and jurisprudence, this chapter begins in section II by 
contextualising the discussion and setting out vital background to it. This section 
locates the relevance and central importance of the ‘consumer’ to the competition law 
enterprise generally, explaining why competition law rules were incorporated within 
the EU legal order and outlining their objectives. It notes that, although the objectives 
of the rules have not been made explicit, and have evolved, the emerging view is that 
their primary goal is, or should be, to prohibit the conduct of undertakings—entities 
engaged in economic activity
10—which distorts competition in a way which harms the 
welfare of consumers and economic efficiency. Section II then goes on to consider 
what implications the debate over objectives has for competition law and how it 
influences the meaning attributed to the term ‘consumer’ within it. In particular, it 
considers whether a sole consumer welfare objective is pursued in EU law and, if so, 
what precisely consumer welfare means and which consumers’ welfare the rules seek 
to protect. 
Section III scrutinises how the interpretation of the competition law rules 
impacts on the question of how, and to what extent, the interests of the identified 
consumers are protected in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and, at the 
same time, the vision of the consumer drawn, and the role that they play, in this 
process.
11
 It observes that even if a consumer welfare objective is agreed, putting 
                                                 
5
 See the Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para 56. 
6
 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (the ‘EUMR’) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Art 2(1)(b).  
7
 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paras 38–39.  
8
 Case C–501/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I–9291. 
9
 Case C–52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I–527, para 22. See also 
discussion of marginal and average consumers, see section III.B.i in this chapter. 
10
 See (n 2) for the definition of undertaking in EU competition law.  
11
 Given the breadth and scope of the Treaty competition rules, this chapter will focus principally on 
the role of the consumer in the application of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU which, together with the EUMR 
  
‘consumers’ at the core of the competition endeavour, there is considerable 
disagreement amongst commentators, policy- and law-makers as to how that ambition 
can be achieved in practice. It will be seen that, in the EU, the Commission or other 
claimants do not generally have to prove directly that the scrutinised conduct harms 
the welfare of consumers. Rather, EU law ordinarily tests indirectly for infringements 
through the application of presumptions and/or indirect assessments of the ability of 
the undertakings at issue to exercise market power. Consequently a recurrent theme 
which arises is the tension that exists between pursuing a consumer welfare objective 
and actually putting in place workable tests which can accurately determine harm or 
benefit to consumer interests. Because workability may entail a certain crudeness in 
the tests adopted, an important issue is frequently whether the tests utilised achieve 
the consumer welfare objective articulated by the Commission or whether, in 
particular, the rules might at times be either over-inclusive—so sometimes 
condemning legitimate business practices (creating a risk of false positives or ‘Type 
1’ errors), and so potentially chilling pro-competitive conduct which benefits 
consumers, or under-inclusive—allowing anti-competitive practices which harm 
consumers to escape antitrust prohibitions (creating a risk of false negatives or ‘Type 
2’ errors).12 Furthermore, a second crucial issue that impacts on the application of EU 
competition law is whether, and if so when, other objectives, in particular the internal 
market objective, can ever trump and therefore override a consumer welfare objective 
where the goals clash, 
Section IV briefly examines the rise of a stronger and more empowered 
consumer in the context of the public and private enforcement of the EU competition 
rules, and touches upon the relationship between regulation, consumer and 
competition law. Section V summarises the findings of this chapter and suggests a 
taxonomy of the images of the consumer in EU Competition law, arguing that this 
variety of images is apparent rather than real and effectively dependent upon the 
context in which the term ‘consumer’ is used. It also concludes that the fluidity of 
some of the key concepts that Competition law employs and the boundaries within 
which this discipline operates frequently means that an uncertain correlation exists 
between the motivation guiding the application of the rules and the promotion of the 
interests of final consumers. 
 
II. THE OBJECTIVES OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
A.  Why Competition Law? The American Experience 
More than 125 jurisdictions around the world now have in place systems of 
competition law (or antitrust law as they are known in the US).13 Broadly, such 
systems are designed to protect the process of competition in which active consumers 
buy products from suppliers competing vigorously to offer products (and services) 
                                                                                                                                            
(n 6), constitute the core competition pillars that apply directly to the conduct of undertakings, see (nn 
26- 27) and accompanying text.  
12
 See section III.B in this chapter.  
13
 In contrast, ‘[u]ntil the mid-20th century less than 10 competition regimes existed worldwide’, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Benchmarking Competition Systems: A 
Global Survey of Major Institutional Characteristics’ 
<http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/ResearchPartnership/Benchmarking-
Competition.aspx> accessed 2 February 2015. 
  
which represent the best value for money (in terms of price, quality and choice),14 and 
to deal with market imperfections arising, in a free market economy. The question that 
naturally follows, however, is: why precisely do states wish to protect competition 
and whose interests do they protect in so doing? The starting point is that without 
competition law rules, firms may be free to act to distort the process of competition 
by, for example, colluding or merging with their competitors. Further, firms which 
win the competitive battle or ‘natural’ monopolies may be free to act without any 
competitive restraint being exercised over their behaviour. Many competition law 
systems now pursue, or purport to pursue, a purely economic goal, seeking to prohibit 
such distortions which preclude the competition process in the free market from 
delivering products and/or services which offer consumers the best value for money 
and efficiencies, allocative, productive and/or dynamic. The reality is, however, that 
most systems have more complex origins, which may suggest a desire to protect a 
multiplicity of persons and to achieve a multiplicity of objectives, beyond a purely 
economic one, which do not all necessarily pull in the same direction.  
In the US, for example, although it seems clear that the competition laws were 
initially adopted to meet the public’s desire ‘to do something’ about the trusts which 
were eliminating competition and competitors and gaining control over a swathe of 
core industries (hence they are known in the US as ‘antitrust’ law), the exact 
objective(s) underpinning that desire has been fiercely debated.
15
 Indeed, it has been 
observed that  
 
the debates and events surrounding the passage of the Sherman Act contain 
something for everyone. To generations of observers, the Sherman Act’s 
legislative record has supplied a wishing well into which one can peer to 
glimpse evidence that supports preferred policies.
16
 
 
Scholars have therefore supported competing views as to the legislative intention 
behind the Sherman Act, arguing that it was introduced to achieve a diverse range of 
goals, including ‘non-economic’ ones. These included, for example:17 to preserve 
                                                 
14
 Value for money reflects the fact that consumers’ choices between products reflect not only price but 
also quality, service, functionality, and whether they offer consumers something new and exciting, see 
A Fletcher, ‘Privatisation, Economic Regulation and Competition in the Utilities: Have we got the 
balance right?’ Beesley Lecture Series, 
<http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/Amelia+Fletcher+-
+Beesley+Lecture+14+Nov+2013.pdf/0dd47fdb-f3b2-41e9-9a24-19b46ef271d4> accessed 2 February 
2015. 
15
 The debates and congressional reports stretch to eleven ‘fat’ volumes, H Hovenkamp, The Antitrust 
Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005) 39.  
16
 E Gellhorn, WE Kovacic and S Calkins, Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 5th edn (Eagan, 
Thomson West, 2004) 23. See also, Northern Pacific Railway v United States 356 US 1, 4 (1958). 
17
 See, eg RH Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, The Free Press, 
1993) 51; EM Fox and LA Sullivan, ‘Antitrust-Retrospective and Perspective: Where Are We Coming 
From? Where Are We Going?’ (1987) 62 New York University Law Review 93; R Pitofsky, ‘The 
Political Content of Antitrust’ (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1051; RH Lande, 
‘Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: the Efficiency Interpretation 
Challenged’ (1982) 34 Hastings Law Journal 65; H Hovenkamp, ‘Distributive Justice and the Antitrust 
Laws’ (1982) 51 George Washington Law Review 1; L Schwartz, ‘“Justice” and other Non-Economic 
Goals of Antitrust’ (1979) 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1076; Hovenkamp, The 
Antitrust Enterprise (n 15) 40–41; E Fox, ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A new Equilibrium’ (1981) 
  
opportunities for firms and individuals to enter a market and compete on the merits 
and on reasonable open terms (indeed, it was opportunity for small business that had 
forged the American character); to achieve fairness between big and small businesses 
and farmers; to prevent unfair wealth transfers from consumers to producers; to block 
private accumulations of political power and to protect democratic government;
18
 to 
promote consumer welfare; and/or to achieve a combination of these goals.  
Although many of these broader objectives undoubtedly influenced the 
development of US antitrust law, Bork, a leading representative of the Chicago 
School of Economics, complained that the law cannot achieve such a broad ‘pot 
pourri’ of goals (in particular, protecting smaller competitors may harm competition 
and consumers), and drew attention to the difficulties that would arise were the 
different goals to contradict one another and if non-economic goals were to sacrifice 
the benefits resulting from efficient markets.
19
 Bork went on to set out his view that 
the antitrust laws should pursue only one goal and that goal should be the 
maximisation of consumer welfare and economic efficiency.
20
 
Since then, it has become accepted by the US courts that the antitrust laws do 
aim to prevent conduct which will reduce competition in such a way that consumer 
welfare will be harmed; in particular, the Sherman Act is designed as a ‘consumer 
welfare prescription’.21 Furthermore, and despite initial opposition, there is now 
widespread agreement between the different schools of thought (Chicago, Harvard 
and post-Chicago)
22
 that the antitrust system is  
 
technocratic in the sense that antitrust be defined narrowly to examine only 
those issues that are purely without antitrust’s ability to be measured and 
understood using industrial organization as the basis for economic analysis. 
This technocratic approach moves non-competition economic considerations 
to areas such as sector regulation, the legislative process, or executive fiat. 
Such areas are better equipped than antitrust to deal with political trade-offs 
between law and policy.
23
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
666 Cornell Law Review 1140; G Stigler, ‘The Origin of the Sherman Act’ (1985) 14 Journal of Legal 
Studies 1.  
18
 The American notion of equality (‘all men are created equal’, Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of 
Independence 1776) led to a mistrust of power concentrated in the hands of a few, whether private or 
governmental. The Jeffersonian ideal was diffused power in the hands of citizen farmers and small 
businessmen, see LA Sullivan and WS Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook (MN, 
West Publishing Group, 2006) 5. 
19
 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (n 17) 50 ‘Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to 
give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law? … Only when the issue of goals has 
been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules’. 
20
 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (n 17) 51. He sets out two related propositions. ‘(1) The only legitimate 
goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare; therefore (2) “Competition,” 
for purposes of antitrust analysis, must be understood as a term of art signifying any state of affairs in 
which consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree.’  
21
 Reiter v Sonotone Corp 442 US 330, 343 (1979). See also NCAA v Board of Regents of University of 
Oklahoma 468 US 85, 107–08 (1984). 
22
 Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise (n 15) 31–32.  
23
 R Blair and D Sokol, ‘Welfare Standards in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement’ (2013) 81 Fordham 
Law Review 2497, 2505. 
  
This acceptance still leaves considerable scope, however, for diverging views as to 
exactly what ‘consumer welfare’ means, and how that objective can be achieved.24 
 
B. EU Competition Law: The Treaty Context, Early Enforcement and the 
Emerging Consumer Welfare Objective 
Competition policy is one of the foundational areas of competence of the EU 
institutions. Indeed, the original version of the EEC Treaty provided that its activities 
should include ‘a system ensuring that competition in the [internal market] is not 
distorted’. It thus embedded the principle of ‘undistorted competition’ into the 
fundamental provisions of the Treaty as a mechanism for reinforcing, complementing 
and implementing other Treaty provisions and tasks, in particular, the functioning of 
the internal market.25 The Treaty also incorporated a set of competition provisions 
which are now found in Articles 101–109 TFEU and secondary legislation. The two 
key TFEU competition provisions applicable to undertakings,26 and the focus of this 
chapter, are Articles 101 and 102, which target, respectively, collusive and unilateral 
anti-competitive behaviour.27 Article 101(1) prohibits agreements and concerted 
practices between two or more undertakings which have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition and which do not meet the legal exception criteria set out in 
Article 101(3) (broadly where the restrictions are indispensable to produce sufficient 
countervailing benefits, a fair share of which are passed on to consumers)28 whilst 
Article 102 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.29 These rules are now 
supplemented by the EU Merger Regulation (‘EUMR’), currently Regulation 
139/2004,30 which prohibits mergers (or ‘concentrations’) between undertakings 
which would significantly impede effective competition in the EU. 
Although the TFEU sets out specific prohibitions of anti-competitive 
practices, it neither provides an explanation of what their goals are nor defines the 
core concepts set out within them, such as what constitutes a ‘restriction’ of 
competition, an ‘abuse’ or a ‘dominant position’.31 It has therefore been for the EU 
Courts to put flesh on these provisions and to elucidate their meaning. Those courts 
                                                 
24
 Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise (n 15) 31 and see section II.C of this chapter. 
25
 See now Art 3(1)(b) TFEU, which confers exclusive competence to the EU in ‘the establishment of 
the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’.  
26
 For the definition of undertaking in EU competition law see (n 2).  
27
 The TFEU also contains provisions which prevent states from distorting the competitive process. Art 
106 TFEU sets out rules to prevent Member States maintaining in force measures contrary to the 
competition and other Treaty rules and deals with the application of the competition rules (and other 
rules of the Treaties) to public undertakings and those granted special or exclusive rights by Member 
States. It contains a limited exemption (Art 106(2)) from the Treaty rules for such undertakings which 
has been construed narrowly. Art 37 TFEU also requires Member States which have state monopolies 
of a commercial character to eliminate discrimination between nationals of Member States regarding 
the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed. Arts 107–109 TFEU contain the rules 
that apply to the provision of state aid in the EU.  
28
 See further section III.B.iv of this chapter. Restrictive provisions in an agreement infringing Art 101 
TFEU are void, see Art 101(2) TFEU. 
29
 In both cases, a breach of these provisions will only take place if the agreement or practice has an 
effect, either actual or potential, on intra Union trade. 
30
 See now EUMR (n 6).  
31
 See Arts 101 and 102 TFEU and discussion about the open-ended nature of many provisions in the 
TFEU in (n 2).  
  
have made it clear that Articles 101 and 102 both have the same goal(s),
32
 but have 
shied away from setting out a plain statement of their objectives. The process of 
teasing out their aims has therefore been largely an inductive and evolving one which 
has been surrounded by intense controversy. Some general observations can, however, 
be made. 
First, as a result of the inextricable link between the internal market project 
and the competition law system set out in the EU Treaties, the Court of Justice and the 
General Court have interpreted the competition rules so as to prohibit conduct which 
‘might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Member States’33 and so 
frustrate the most fundamental objectives of the EU, the creation of an internal 
market.
34
 It is clear, therefore, that the EU competition law rules have been used as an 
instrument of market integration, meaning that tensions between the single market 
objective and a purely competition objective can arise.
35
 Significantly, and for the 
purposes of this chapter, it will be seen that the policy of upholding the single market 
objective has been argued to have had a negative impact on consumer interests in 
some cases.  
Second, it is arguable that the EU’s commitment to ‘undistorted competition’ 
enshrines multi-faceted goals
36
 which permit non-competition, or public policy, 
factors to play an influential role in the development of EU competition law or aspects 
of it.
37
 For example, it seems clear that early application of the competition rules was 
influenced, in particular, by Ordoliberal
38
 ideas and the desire to protect the 
competitive process as a mechanism for promoting rivalry, the protection of 
‘individual economic freedom of action as a value in itself’, ‘consumer choice’ and 
for restraining abuse of market dominance. Some such views may have encouraged 
interpretation and application of the competition laws in such a way as to protect 
competitors themselves, rather than the competitive process (and consumers), to 
favour small- or medium-sized enterprises, to keep markets open, to protect the 
process of rivalry between firms and to achieve fairness between firms operating on 
                                                 
32
 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v Commission [1973] 
ECR 215, paras 24–25. 
33
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs v Commission [1966] 
ECR 299, 340. 
34
 For some more recent examples, see Joined Cases C–403 and 429/08 Football Association Premier 
League Ltd v QC Leisure [2011] ECR I–9083, para 139 (Art 101); Cases C–468 Sot Lélos kai Sia EE v 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton [2008] ECR I–7139, paras 65–66 (Art 102). 
35
 See eg section III.B.ii of this chapter.  
36
 D Geradin, A Layne-Farrar and N Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 1.70. 
37
 Indeed, Art 120 TFEU specifically states that ‘the Member States and the Union shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient 
allocation of resources’ but no specific reference is made to an efficient allocation of resources in the 
EU competition rules. 
38
 See, eg P Lowe, ‘Consumer Welfare and Efficiency – New Guiding Principles of Competition 
Policy?’ (13th International Competition and 14th European Competition Day, Munich, 27 March 
2007) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_2007.html> accessed 2 February 2015; W 
Möschel, ‘The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: the example of 
competition policy’ (2001) 157 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 4; D Gerber, Law 
and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1998) 331–33 and P.Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of an “Abuse” of a Dominant Position and its 
Impact on Article 102 TEFU’ in P. Nihoul and I. Takahashi, Abuse Regulation in Competition Law, 
Proceedings of the 10th ASCOLA 2015. 
  
the market. Although many do not agree that Ordoliberalism should be an objective 
pursued today, some references to it may still be gleaned from the Court’s case law.39  
Further, certain public policy goals, such as environmental protection, 
administration of justice and public health, appear to have influenced competition law 
analysis, especially the application of Article 101.
40
 Therefore, even though Articles 
101 and 102 do not themselves specifically refer to such public policy goals,
41
 the EU 
Commission and the EU Courts have sometimes taken account of these factors, 
particularly given the context of the rules within the TFEU and the importance that 
those courts have placed upon teleological and contextual readings of the EU 
Treaties.
42
 Indeed, a complex and controversial issue, which is more alive than ever 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, is whether EU competition law can be 
legitimately isolated from other EU policies. For example, Article 7 TFEU sets out the 
principle of consistency between all EU policies and activities and Articles 11 and 12 
TFEU provide, respectively, for the integration of environmental and consumer 
protection requirements in the implementation of other EU policies, which naturally 
include competition policy.  
 Third, the emerging view of the European Commission (the ‘Commission’), 
which has sought to modernise its application and interpretation of the competition 
law rules since the end of the 1990s, and to distance itself from the previous approach 
based on broader ‘public policy’ objectives, is that the appropriate goal for Articles 
101 and 102, and the EUMR, is ‘to protect competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources’.43 
The Commission takes the view that pursuit of this goal, which is supported by many 
commentators, will ensure the efficient functioning of markets to the benefit of 
consumers and the global competitiveness of EU businesses. Indeed, former 
Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia stressed that consumer welfare is not 
just a catchy phrase; rather it ‘is the cornerstone, the guiding principle of EU 
competition policy’.44    
 
                                                 
39
 See eg, Case C–1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência, 
judgment of 28 Feb 2013, paras 92–93 and see also nn (61–62) of this chapter and accompanying text. 
40
 See C Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) ch 2. For example, 
in Case C–309/99 JCJ Wouters, JW Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de 
Europese Gemeenschap [2002] ECR I–1577, para 97, the Court found that rules adopted in the 
Netherlands which prohibited members of the Bar practising in full partnership with accountants did 
not have as their object or effect the restriction of competition. Although the arrangements restricted 
services that could be offered and reduced scope for efficiencies, the Court concluded that it was not 
unreasonable for the Bar Council to take the view that these restraints were necessary for the proper 
practice of the legal profession. 
41
 In fact the Art 101(3) Guidelines (n 4) only refer to economic efficiencies to the exclusion of non-
economic considerations. See further R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law, 7th edn (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 160.  
42
 Case C–519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I–6991, para 45; 
JCJ Wouters (n 40) para 97 ff; and Case T–193/02 Laurent Piau v Commission [2005] ECR II–209, 
para 102. 
43
 Art 101(3) Guidelines (n 4) para 13.  
44
 J Almunia, ‘Competition – What’s in it for Consumers?’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-11-803_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 2 February 2015. 
  
C. Consumer Welfare as an Objective of EU Competition Law: Which 
Consumers’ Welfare Does Competition Law Protect? 
The discussion above indicates that it is crucial both to the rationality of any 
competition law system, and to the question of whose interests it protects, that its 
goals are well-defined. Further, although it is clear that the overall purpose of EU 
competition law is to ensure a system of undistorted competition within the internal 
market that can contribute to the achievement of the aims and wellbeing of the 
European Union, the crucial issue of what specific objectives it pursues in order to 
achieve this overarching goal has not been clarified. Nonetheless, the Commission 
has, in the course of its process of modernisation, sought to rectify the uncertainty by 
reiterating its belief that competition rules should be designed to promote consumer 
welfare and efficiency. 
One essential problem with the ‘consumer welfare’ concept articulated, and 
which is now championed as the goal of a number of competition law systems around 
the world, is that it is often used, especially by competition agencies, without clear 
explanation of what exactly is meant by it and exactly which consumers’ welfare it 
protects. Indeed, when Bork adopted the term it was only rarely used and had no 
standard meaning in economics.
45
 The phrase has thus been described by some as a 
‘shibboleth’46 or as ‘the most abused term’47 in modern antitrust analysis.  
In the competition law context, the term consumer welfare is ordinarily used 
as a synonym for one of two things. When Bork used this phrase in his seminal 
book,
48
 he appears to have meant what is now referred to as ‘total’ or ‘social welfare’: 
that is, the objective of maximising efficiency for society as a whole (the sum of 
producer surplus and consumer surplus– that is total surplus) whoever benefits from 
those efficiency gains (whether producers or consumers).
49
 On this approach, the total 
welfare of consumers as a class and the ‘wealth of the nation’ overall is used to assess 
changes in welfare—consequently, everyone in society (whether producers, 
distributors, retailers or final consumers) is characterised as a ‘consumer’ and 
competition law is not concerned with how that wealth is distributed amongst sellers 
and buyers and the members of society. Rather, so long as winners gain more than 
losers lose, total welfare is maximised and the conduct should be permitted.
50
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Another view, however, which now appears to have become the standard,
51
 is 
that the objective of the competition law rules should be the maximisation of 
efficiency but only if consumers receive a fair share of the total wealth—so the goal is 
to maximise consumer surplus,
52
 and consequently it is this narrower aim which 
should be identified with consumer welfare. Under this elucidation, consumers are 
equated with ‘buyers’ on the market. 
In most cases pursuit of either a total or (narrower) consumer welfare 
objective will achieve the same outcome. In exceptional circumstances, however, 
pursuit of the consumer welfare objective could result in the prohibition of conduct 
which results in an increase in efficiency overall, but which creates a transfer of 
consumer surplus to producers;
53
 this concept thus favours buyers over sellers.
54
 It is 
therefore crucial to know which of the outlined approaches the law favours and, 
consequently, which consumers’ interests it protects: whether it is those of all of 
society, some groups within it (all those on the buyer side) and/or some groups more 
than others (final consumers more than intermediate buyers).
55
  
The Commission has not explicitly stated which standard it prefers. 
Nonetheless, it does appear to have rejected the broader social welfare standard 
expounded by Bork and to support the narrower consumer welfare standard. In press 
releases, speeches, policy documents and reports, it continually stresses that it acts for 
the benefit of European consumers and to prevent practices which will result in 
‘consumer detriment’, resulting from higher prices, reduced output or choice or lower 
quality of goods or services, or diminished innovation. It thus seeks to maintain an 
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undistorted system of competition which will, in turn, deliver consumer benefit. 
Although the adoption of this narrower standard is not uncontroversial, it does gain 
some support from the TFEU itself.
56
 For example, Article 101(3), which provides the 
legal exception to Article 101(1) for restrictive agreements that produce 
countervailing benefits, demands that a ‘fair share’ of such identified benefits or 
efficiencies must be passed on to consumers (see further section III.B.iv below). 
Further, Article 102 specifically states that an abuse of a dominant position may 
consist of (a) imposing ‘unfair’ selling prices or unfair trading conditions,57 (b) 
‘limiting production, markets or technical development’ to the prejudice of consumers 
or (c) engaging in discriminatory behaviour (‘applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage’) (see further section III.B.v below). Similarly, Article 
2(1)(b) of the EUMR states that there is need to take account of the ‘interests of 
intermediate and ultimate consumers’ when assessing the compatibility of a proposed 
concentration with EU law. In addition, pursuit of a consumer welfare objective—
focussing more closely on allocative rather than productive efficiency—may be 
justifiable on the grounds that it is easier to apply than a social welfare objective and 
that it is a more palatable objective as it evokes ‘ideas of fairness, redistribution, and 
protection of the many and vulnerable, making this rhetoric attractive to politicians, 
policy-makers, and competition officials.’58 
 An important issue that presides over the consumer welfare debate in the 
EU, however, is that, despite support for a consumer welfare approach from the 
Commission and a number of commentators and practitioners, the case law of the 
Court does not unambiguously endorse it as the ultimate objective of EU Competition 
law. While, in 2006, two judgments of the General Court, Österreichische 
Postsparkasse AG and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v Commission and 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission indicated support for such a 
goal,59 subsequent judgments of the Court of Justice have placed greater emphasis on 
the need to protect not only the interests of consumers, but the interests of competitors 
and the structure of the market and competition as such.60 In TeliaSonera,61 for 
example, the Court held that the function of the Treaty competition rules is precisely 
‘to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, 
individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the 
European Union.’  
 The Court therefore seems to attach significant importance to competition as 
a process that should in itself be protected. Although this could be taken to suggest 
support for broader goals and/or Ordoliberal ideas, it could also support the view that 
protecting that process, and precluding hindrances to it, benefits consumers—that is, 
that protecting the market structure from artificial distortions is the best mechanism 
for protecting the interests of the consumer in the medium to longer term. Further, 
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these statements clearly indicate that the Court considers that the welfare of 
consumers forms at least part of the EU competition law fabric, even if it is not its 
sole or core objective. Indeed, in Post Danmark,62 the Grand Chamber of the Court 
gave a judgment which, although containing no express statement about the objectives 
of the law, did focus heavily on the effects of the conduct on consumers, and in 
Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission,63 the Court placed emphasis on the 
poor allocation of resources to the detriment, in particular, of consumers that results 
from certain types of collusive behaviour between firms liable to infringe Article 101.
 In sum, therefore, important observations, relevant to our examination of the 
roles of the consumer in EU competition law, are that whilst the Commission has, 
post-modernisation, enthusiastically adopted consumer welfare as the key objective of 
EU competition law in its Guidance documents, the Court has been more guarded in 
ranking it above other equally important objectives: in particular, the single market 
project and the promotion of competition itself. Further, if it is to be accepted that EU 
competition pursues, whether solely or primarily, a ‘consumer’ welfare objective in 
the narrow sense, a few important conclusions can be drawn about the meaning of 
‘consumer’ and ‘consumer welfare’ in this competition law context and the way that 
competition law protects such consumers’ interests.  
First, a statement that the competition law system pursues a ‘consumer 
welfare’ objective denotes that it pursues an economic objective. Although there is a 
debate in the EU as to whether non-economic or public policy factors can also be 
taken into account in a competition law assessment (and if so where and how), the 
consumer welfare objective itself does not seem to incorporate non-economic 
considerations as it does in the consumer protection realm.
64
 
Second, it follows from the structure of the Treaty, which contains a set of 
prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour, that the principal focus of the rules is on 
eliminating conduct stemming from anti-competitive agreements, conduct or mergers 
of undertakings that is liable to harm consumer welfare rather than on actively 
promoting it through positive action. Consequently, there are some distortions of 
competition and market imperfections which operate to prevent the process of 
competition delivering value for money to consumers that competition law cannot 
reach. In such cases, consumer law and/or regulatory tools might be required, 
alternatively or additionally, to make markets work more efficiently for the benefit of 
consumers (see further III. C below).  
Third, despite the populist rhetoric that might seem inherent in the slogan 
‘consumer welfare’, such an objective is not designed solely to protect the interests of 
‘final consumers’ (natural persons acting outside their ‘trade, business, craft or 
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profession’)65 or individual ‘consumers’ (persons who purchase goods or services for 
personal use).
66
 Although, it will be seen that the EU Courts and Commission do 
sometimes use the term consumer in these narrower senses when making substantive 
competition law assessments (see further III below) and the Commission has a 
tendency to emphasise the benefits that the enforcement the competition law rules 
have for individual citizens, ‘consumers’ in this technical sense encompasses all those 
on the buyer side, whether they are indirect or direct users, small or large, natural or 
legal persons (indeed many will be businesses), intermediate buyers or final 
consumers. This broader definition of the consumer concept, although perhaps 
counterintuitive, is explicable on the basis of the rationale underlying the application 
of competition law.
67
 The rules promote the process of competition for the benefit of 
all such consumers and do not perform the more protective function performed by 
consumer law, such as safeguarding the interests of those perceived to be the weaker 
or more vulnerable party in individual contractual transactions.
68
 This broad 
construction of the term ‘consumer’ is crucial, as it provides the fulcrum on which 
secondary assessments and interpretations of the core concepts set out in the 
competition law rules are based. We return to this point in section III when we 
consider the role that the consumer plays in competition law assessments. 
Fourth, because the consumer welfare objective seeks to protect the interests 
of the relevant ‘consumers’ overall, it is frequently necessary, in determining whether 
the rules have been infringed, to weigh the interests of some groups of consumers’ 
against those of others. Further, harm to current consumers may have to be weighed 
against the (more speculative) benefits to future consumers which may be achieved by 
the conduct in the longer-term (and vice versa). Indeed, an approach focussing only 
on immediate consumer interests might be at risk, in particular, of disregarding the 
impact of the conduct on competition, productivity and/or innovation and the interests 
of consumers in the long run (see further III below).
69
 The term ‘consumer’ thus has a 
general rather than an individual character. 
Fifth, the objective pursued may also have an impact upon how the rules are 
enforced: in particular, how a public enforcement agency determines in what way to 
devote its resources towards enforcement and whether private enforcement should be 
permitted and encouraged (see section IV). Finally, it is seen in the section below that 
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even if an overarching consumer welfare objective is agreed and pursued, this is not 
an easy objective to achieve. 
 
III. ACHIEVING A CONSUMER WELFARE OBJECTIVE; CONSUMER 
WELFARE AS A ‘GUIDE’ IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
A. Introduction: Market Power and Rules and Standards 
In the previous section we introduced the idea that the image of the consumer used to 
define the objectives of EU competition law is a wide-ranging one. In this section, we 
examine more closely how EU Competition law seeks to achieve that objective and 
how the interests of different groups of consumers are taken into account in so doing. 
This enables us, simultaneously, to analyse other visions of the ‘consumer’ that 
emerge in the competition law context, in particular when identified as a tool in the 
process of making competition law assessments.  
A particular problem in achieving a consumer welfare objective is that it is not 
ordinarily realistic or feasible to test directly in an individual case how the conduct at 
issue has, or will have, an impact upon consumer welfare, because efficiency is 
difficult to measure. Such an objective does not mean therefore that all conduct can, 
or should, be tested under competition law to see whether it harms or benefits 
consumer welfare.
70
 
Rather, because it is frequently too difficult to measure how conduct affects 
efficiencies directly, the overarching objective plays a role principally by guiding or 
shaping the interpretation of core concepts (such as a ‘restriction’ of competition or an 
‘abuse’ of a dominant position) and the crafting of tests and/or presumptions to 
identify such conduct. These tests are guided by economics and, in particular, by an 
assessment of whether the conduct at issue is liable to interfere with the competitive 
process and/or to permit the relevant undertakings to exercise market power—‘the 
ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time or 
to maintain output in terms of product quantities, product quality and variety or 
innovation below competitive levels for a significant period of time’71—and/or 
achieve offsetting efficiencies. Because they cannot always replicate economists’ 
(frequently conflicting) views,
72
 in many cases it is necessary, in considering how to 
construct legal rules or standards aimed at distinguishing anti-competitive from pro-
competitive conduct (to separate the antitrust goats from the beneficial sheep),
73
 for a 
trade-off to be made between the application of more complex standards or clearer 
bright-line rules. The former require detailed factual and economic analysis, which is 
more difficult and costly to apply both by undertakings and decision-takers, whilst the 
latter require less sophisticated analysis and less emphasis on expert economic 
evidence but which may, consequently, be less accurate in some cases. In making 
such trade-offs, it will be necessary to consider whether an approach which may 
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sometimes condemn legitimate business practices and allow Type 1 errors is a lesser 
or greater evil than one which may sometimes allow Type 2 errors.
74
 
 In the next sections we will consider the references to, and relevance of, the 
consumer and consumer interests in the framework of five key competition law 
assessments: (i) the assessment of market power and dominance; (ii) the 
determination of when presumptions of harm to consumer welfare should be 
employed in the application of Article 101; (iii) the determination of when 
presumptions of no harm to consumer welfare should be employed in the application 
of Article 101; (iv) the balancing of anti and pro-competitive effects in the context of 
Article 101; and (v) the determination of what constitutes an ‘abuse’ under Article 
102.  
 
B. Substantive Interpretation of the Law: Identifying Anticompetitive 
Conduct and the Role of the Consumer in Competition Law Assessments 
(i) The consumer in the assessment of market power and dominance 
A core concern of competition law is that there should be effective competition in 
markets and firms should not be able to engage in anticompetitive agreements, 
conduct or mergers which will permit them to exercise market power and deprive 
consumers of the benefits that that competition would otherwise bring, through low 
prices, choice, quality and/or innovation. Many competition law assessments thus 
commence with a consideration of the relevant undertaking’s (or undertakings’) 
market power.
75
 
Article 102, for example, targets only the behaviour of firms that possess a 
‘dominant position’—a concept which the Court has equated with market rather than 
commercial power and the ability of the ‘dominant firm’ to maintain prices above 
competitive levels
76—and so might be in a position to exploit that market power and 
to engage in anticompetitive conduct which excludes competitors from the market. 
Dominance has been defined by the Court in Hoffmann-La Roche as a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking ‘which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and 
ultimately of the consumers’.77 
In this case, it can be seen that the Court refers to ‘consumers’ more narrowly 
than in the way identified in the discussion of ‘consumer welfare’ above, seemingly 
equating the concept with final consumers and distinguishing them from competitors 
and other customers (or consumers) operating on the buyer side. Although this might 
at first appear to suggest a different vision of the term ‘consumer’, on closer scrutiny, 
it is seen that it is not in fact symptomatic of an inconsistent approach but is just a 
reflection of the different context in which the notion is used. Rather, the ostensibly 
different vision drawn emerges because the final consumer in this case is simply 
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identified as part of the process of ascertaining the features of a dominant firm which 
distinguishes it from a non-dominant one; in this case, the Court thus equates the 
ability of the dominant firm to act independently of buyers (direct customers or final 
consumers) and other suppliers (competitors) with its ability to exercise market 
power—to maintain higher prices whilst at the same time maintaining a much greater 
market share than those of its competitors.
78
  
The term consumer also appears, and plays an important role, when 
determining the relevant market in which the competition law assessment takes place; 
in this case the different categories of consumer again play a distinct role in the 
process of determining the relevant market, which is simply one step taken on the 
route to the final determination of whether an infringement of the competition law 
rules (which harms consumer welfare) has been committed. In competition law, the 
question of whether one or more firms has/have market power (or a dominant 
position) is generally determined not directly
79
 but indirectly through use of proxies 
such as an analysis of market shares and other factors such as barriers to entry into the 
market. This requires the ‘relevant’ market on which the undertakings concerned 
operate to be identified (from both a product and geographic perspective) so that an 
assessment of the conditions of competition on that market can be made. Where this 
approach is taken, market definition sets out an important preliminary step which 
permits the identification of the boundaries of competition between firms, the 
competitive constraints that the relevant undertaking(s) face from actual competitors, 
potential new entrants and/or buyers and, consequently, an assessment of whether or 
not it has sufficient market power, for example, to be found dominant or to restrict 
competition on that market.
80
 
The Court has held that the relevant market consists of products (or services) 
which are interchangeable with each other but not (or only to a limited extent) 
interchangeable with those outside it. This interchangeability may be with other 
products or with the same products from elsewhere; it thus has both a product (the 
product market) and a geographical dimension (the geographic market). Although the 
Court has stressed the importance of using qualitative criteria such as characteristics, 
price and intended use
81
 for assessing functional interchangeability, the truth is that 
these criteria are not always very helpful in shedding light on the core issue that the 
process is seeking to answer;
82
 ie whether the undertaking or undertakings are 
operating on markets which may be monopolised. Competition agencies, including 
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the Commission, thus tend now to use less subjective and more scientific mechanisms 
for determining the relevant markets, in particular, by relying on the hypothetical 
monopolist, or Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (‘SSNIP’), test 
to provide a conceptual framework for their identification. Essentially, the test starts 
by hypothesising a particular relevant market (for example, a market for bottled 
sparkling water in France) and then assuming a small (5–10%) rise in the price of that 
product. It is then asked whether this price increase would cause customers to 
purchase another product (for example, bottled still water), or to purchase bottled 
sparkling water from another area, to such an extent that the price rise is unprofitable.  
 
If substitution were enough to make the price increase unprofitable because of 
the resulting loss of sales, additional substitutes and areas are included in the 
relevant market. This would be done until the set of products and geographical 
areas is such that small, permanent increases in relative prices would be 
profitable.
83
 
 
The SSNIP test thus requires an assessment of demand substitution (determination of 
the range of products viewed as substitutes by consumers (or customers) on the buyer 
side) and supply substitution (whether suppliers are able to switch production to the 
relevant products and market them in the short term without incurring significant 
additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices) 
to determine whether the hypothetical price rise would be possible. 
It is against this background that the use of the term ‘consumer’ in the 
Commission’s Notice on the definition of the relevant market (the ‘Market Definition’ 
Notice)
84
 and cases must be understood. The discussion above establishes that in 
identifying the market, too great an emphasis must not be placed on the subjective 
viewpoint of any one group, or groups, of consumers. For example, the Commission 
and Court were criticised in the classic case of United Brands
85
 for identifying a 
relevant product market for ‘bananas’ partly on the basis that there was a distinct 
group of final consumers (the young, the elderly, the sick) who would not think that 
bananas could be substituted for other kinds of fruits.
86
 The SSNIP test clarifies, 
however, that the important question in determining whether bananas can be 
identified as a relevant market which could be monopolised (ie whether it is an 
economically meaningful market) is not whether there are some consumers who will 
not switch to another product following a rise in its price or even whether a majority 
of consumers will not switch, but whether a sufficient number of consumers will 
switch to make the price rise unprofitable. If therefore it is impossible to discriminate 
against the ‘infra-marginal’ customers who cannot, or who will not, switch—in the 
bananas case, the young, old and sick—by charging them a higher price, then the 
behaviour of marginal customers (who are able to switch) must be taken into account 
as it is this (not the behaviour of groups of consumers or even the average consumer) 
which affects a supplier’s pricing decisions and which is, consequently, crucial in the 
determination of the market.
87
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The Commission stresses the importance of the marginal consumer in its 
Market Definition Notice. For example, it states that the question to be answered in 
applying the SSNIP test is whether ‘the parties’ customers’ could switch to substitutes 
in such volume to make the price increase unprofitable (because of the resulting loss 
of sales). By way of practical example it states: 
 
In practice, the question to address would be whether consumers of flavour A 
would switch to other flavours when confronted with a permanent price 
increase of 5% to 10% for flavour A. If a sufficient number of consumers 
would switch to, say, flavour B, to such an extent that the price increase for 
flavour A would not be profitable owing to the resulting loss of sales, then the 
market would comprise at least flavours A and B. The process would have to 
be extended in addition to other available flavours until a set of products is 
identified for which a price rise would not induce a sufficient substitution in 
demand.
88
 
 
In the Market Definition Notice, the Commission seems to use the terms ‘customers’ 
and ‘consumers’ interchangeably to emphasise the importance of testing consumers’ 
preferences as a whole.
89
 
An important practical problem, however, arises in actually applying the 
SSNIP test. How are customers’ (or consumers’) reactions to the hypothetical price 
rise to be gauged? In the EU, the Commission is willing to use both empirical 
evidence (using preliminary information gathered from, in particular, the investigated 
firms, their main customers,
90
 suppliers and competitors as well as other industry 
players) and quantitative tests
91
 devised by economists.
92
 Although such techniques 
are not panaceas, they can, when used correctly and rigorously, be helpful tools to use 
within the SSNIP framework. The past and future reactions of consumers (whether 
intermediate or final) may thus be important to the analysis where relevant evidence is 
available: for example, evidence of consumers’ past behaviour or ‘revealed 
preference’ (ie reaction to past changes in prices)93 or evidence of how they might 
behave in the future when making estimations of cross-elasticity.
94
 
 
(ii) Presumptions of harm to consumer welfare: agreements which have as 
their object the restriction of competition 
Defining relevant markets and then assessing whether the conduct at issue facilitates, 
or will facilitate, the strengthening or exercise of such market power involves 
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complex and time-consuming analysis. Although such analysis is necessary in many 
cases (see sections (iv) and (v) below), most competition law systems take shortcuts 
and seek to sidestep a full analysis in cases where anti-competitive effects are very 
likely (or where they are very unlikely: see (iii) below). For example, competition law 
systems frequently apply presumptions of illegality to agreements which clearly 
distort the process of competition and which are always, or virtually always, likely to 
restrict competition. Clear rules against such obviously pernicious conduct are 
considered acceptable as they eradicate the need for a claimant to prove, at cost, its 
adverse consequences. In the EU, Article 101(1) allows for a (rebuttable) presumption 
of illegality to be applied,
95
 as it prohibits both agreements which have as their object 
the restriction of competition and those which have such an effect. The Court has 
made it plain that the words ‘object or effect’ are alternative,96 not cumulative, 
requirements: so if the object of the agreement is found to be ‘sufficiently 
deleterious’, it need not be established that it also has a restrictive effect. Complex 
market analysis and proof of actual or likely effects on competition and consumers are 
thus avoided
97
 - a restriction of competition is assumed. Although an infringement of 
Article 101 can be avoided by the parties demonstrating that the agreement has off-
setting benefits and meets the criteria for legal exception under Article 101(3), in 
practice discharging this burden is difficult. Indeed, the Commission’s view is that 
such agreements are presumed not to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) (so the 
conduct is generally prohibited by the competition law rules).
98
 
A crucially important question therefore is which agreements have as their 
object the restriction of competition and how is it determined which agreements fall 
within that object category? Clearly if an overarching consumer welfare objective is 
to be achieved, best practice suggests that the rule should be drawn on the basis of 
economic principles so that it yields minimal error costs (especially from over-
inclusive presumptions of illegality which may lead to false positives: ie wrongly 
presuming that pro-competitive agreements infringe the competition law rules).
99
  
The EU courts have held that the objectives, context and content
100
 of an 
agreement are critical to the determination of whether it is ‘by its very nature’ 
injurious to competition and restrictive of competition by object. Content, in 
particular, holds significant weight
101
 and jurisprudence establishes that specific 
agreements, including horizontal cartels
102—broadly, anti-competitive arrangements 
between competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish 
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output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets
103—and certain vertical 
agreements (see further below) are likely to be found restrictive by object. In a recent 
decision, the Court has reiterated that the category of agreements restrictive of 
competition by object must be interpreted restrictively and applied to situations where 
an agreement inherently reveals a ‘sufficient degree of harm to competition’.104 
The assumption of a restriction of competition in relation to cartel activity is 
uncontroversial. Indeed, as there is growing international acceptance that such activity 
poses a serious threat to economies and consumers and constitutes ‘the supreme evil 
of antitrust’105 and ‘the most egregious’106 violation of competition law, many 
antitrust systems do treat such conduct as an ‘automatic’ violation of the rules.107 
Parties to cartels deliberately set out to interfere with free competition, to contradict 
the principles of the free market economy and to act instead to protect the prosperity 
of the participants as a whole. In addition, such agreements are costly to create and 
enforce,
108
 they harm efficiency (they are estimated to cost society billions
109
) and are 
‘naked’—‘[t]hey seek to restrict competition without producing any objective 
countervailing benefits’.110 The direct interference with the free operation of 
competition justifies the presumption of illegality to all cartels, whatever the parties’ 
market shares, the level of the market at which the cartel operates, the product or 
service involved and whether or not it can be demonstrated that the cartel has in fact 
harmed consumer welfare or final consumers. Their likely impact upon welfare (total 
and consumer) thus operates as a guide for rules because most cartels will reduce 
‘consumer welfare’ and will never increase it.111 Indeed, in Groupement des cartes 
bancaires, the Court held that since horizontal price fixing by cartels 
 
may be considered so likely to have negative effects, in particular on the price, 
quantity or quality of the goods and services, that it may be considered 
redundant, for the purposes of applying Article [101(1)], to prove that they 
have actual effects on the market … Experience shows that such behaviour 
leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of 
resources to the detriment, in particular, of consumers.
112
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The extent to which the object category should be used in relation to agreements other 
than naked cartel activity is, however, controversial.
113
 In the EU it has also been held 
to encompass vertical agreements
114
 containing provisions fixing the minimum prices 
at which retailers can sell the contract products (resale price maintenance: ‘RPM’)115 
and those conferring absolute territorial protection (‘ATP’) on a distributor or 
otherwise partitioning national markets.
116
 Vertical agreements are, however, not 
ordinarily concluded between competitors but between providers of complementary 
goods and services. Consequently, they are less ‘obviously’ anti-competitive than 
horizontal agreements and provide greater scope for efficiencies. Indeed, a 
manufacturer of a product will generally want to ensure that its product is distributed 
in the most efficient manner possible so that it competes more effectively with the 
products of its competitors. Vertical agreements may, therefore, be used to expand 
markets through solving free-rider or double marginalisation problems, to lower costs 
through efficiencies and/or to promote investment and innovation through solving a 
‘hold up’ problem. The assumption that a vertical agreement, which has more 
ambiguous welfare effects, restricts competition arguably creates a greater risk that 
false positives will result and the consumer welfare will not be achieved because 
consumers may be deprived of the benefit of an efficiency-enhancing agreement.  
This point is illustrated by the early case of Consten and Grundig.
117
 In this 
case the Commission had held that distribution arrangements, which resulted in 
Consten being granted the exclusive right to sell Grundig products in France (neither 
Grundig itself nor any other Grundig distributor was entitled to sell the products there) 
had as its object the restriction of competition. The parties disputed this assessment 
arguing that the agreement was pro-competitive; it had been essential to enable 
Grundig to penetrate the French market. Indeed, without the promise of ATP, Consten 
would not have agreed to take the risk of acting as distributor in France as other 
distributors (outside of France) would have been able to take a ‘free ride’ upon its 
promotional and investment efforts there. Although, therefore, the agreement resulted 
in the existence of only one distributor of Grundig products in France (there was a 
restriction on competition between distributors of Grundig products—a restriction of 
intra-brand competition), the agreement led to an increase in competition for 
consumer electronics products in France (ie there was an increase in inter-brand 
competition) and, consequently, had beneficial effects for consumers. The parties 
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argued therefore that the Commission should have conducted a fuller market analysis 
to determine whether the agreement had as its effect the restriction of competition.
118
 
The Court, however, upheld the Commission’s Decision. The agreement giving 
Consten the exclusive right of sale of Grundig products in France had as its object the 
restriction of competition so an assessment of its effect was deemed unnecessary. It 
also upheld the Commission’s view that the agreement did not meet the Article 101(3) 
criteria. The Court has reiterated this strict stance towards absolute territorial vertical 
restraints on several occasions.
119
 
This line of cases is important. First, it illustrates how EU competition rules 
are, in the context of vertical territorial restraints, influenced by the internal market 
project;
120
 concerns about the impact of an agreement on the integration of national 
markets may therefore outweigh efficiency arguments raised by the parties.  
Second, it illustrates more broadly that the more extensive the category of 
agreements to which a virtually irrefutable presumption of illegality is applied, the 
greater the risk that some pro-competitive agreements will be condemned, and others 
deterred, with the effect that competition, and consumers, may be harmed. In the EU 
the question of whether it is rational or reasonable to assume vertical territorial, and 
price, restraints restrict competition and/or whether a change of approach is required, 
has provoked extensive debate.
121
 Arguably, the approach is not defensible given the 
potential for such agreements to increase inter-brand competition and consumer 
welfare. 
The application of the EU rebuttable presumption of illegality to these cases is 
strongly supported by the Commission. The Commission and the Court consistently 
stress the importance of the competitive process at all levels of the market and have 
been concerned about arrangements which result in the elimination of rivalry and 
competition (or price competition) between distributors of a manufacturer’s product. 
Further, the Commission has emphasised that the risk of Type 1 errors is minimised 
as it is always open to the parties to demonstrate that the agreement does in fact 
produce efficiencies which are passed on to consumers. 
Third, and crucially for the purposes of our discussion, the assumption of a 
restriction of competition demonstrates that where an automatic presumption of harm 
to consumer welfare is applied, there is no need for any image of the consumer to be 
drawn, or considered, at the Article 101(1) stage of the assessment. The extent to 
which consumer interests have really been harmed by the anti-competitive behaviour 
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is not examined; it is taken for granted. These consumer interests are only considered 
at a later analytical stage, in particular if the parties attempt to establish that the 
Article 101(1) prohibition does not apply because the agreement produces offsetting 
efficiencies and delivers consumer benefits under Article 101(3) (see section (iv) 
below).  
 
(iii) Presumptions of legality: safe harbours 
At the other end of the spectrum, many competition law systems apply a presumption 
of legality to agreements between parties which are unlikely to have sufficient market 
power to be able to restrict competition.
122
 In the EU, an agreement is presumed to be 
legal either: (a) where any restriction of competition is liable to be insignificant, or de 
minimis,
123
 because of the very weak position of the parties; or (b) because it falls 
within the scope of one of the EU block exemption regulations (which are directly 
applicable), so it is presumed to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3).  
Block exemptions have generally been crafted by the Commission,
124
 
following its experience of examining agreements individually, to grant an 
‘exemption’ under Article 101(3) to categories of agreements which, in its experience, 
are unlikely to restrict competition and/or are likely to generate efficiencies—in 
particular, where the parties do not have significant market shares and where the 
agreements do not contain listed ‘hard core restraints’. The list of hard core restraints 
closely mirror the object restraints discussed in section (ii) above and reflects the 
Commission’s view that agreements containing such restraints are presumed to violate 
Article 101 and cannot benefit from a presumption of legality under a block 
exemption.  
Some block exemption regulations pertain to specific sectors (for example, 
insurance).
125
 Others apply more generally, for example, to vertical (Regulation 
                                                 
122
 As Art 102 only applies to the unilateral conduct of undertakings which hold a dominant position 
(see section III.B.i of this paper), unilateral conduct (other than mergers) of firms which are not 
dominant do not fall within the scope of the competition law rules. 
123
 In this respect, see Case 5/69 Franz Völk v SPRL Ets J Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295 and the 
Communication from the Commission – Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (‘De Minimis Notice’) [2014] OJ C291/1.  
124
 They are adopted generally by the Commission, acting in the exercise of delegated powers from the 
Council. 
125
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices in the insurance sector [2010] OJ L83/1. 
  
330/2010),
126
 horizontal cooperation (Regulations 1217/2010
127
and 1218/2010)
128
 or 
technology transfer (Regulation 316/2014)
129
 agreements.  
In the context of block exemptions, therefore, no detailed scrutiny of an 
agreement that falls squarely within the scope of exemption is required as the 
Commission has made an a priori determination that even if such an agreement 
restricts competition, it will satisfy the four conditions of Article 101(3), and in 
particular that consumers will receive a ‘fair share’130 of the benefits generated by the 
agreement (see further section (iv) below).
131
 In other words, the benefits that the 
agreement yields for consumers are taken for granted and presumed; the block 
exemptions operate as a safe harbour and their protection can only be withdrawn 
prospectively.
132
 
 
(iv) Anti-competitive effect in the application of Article 101(1) TFEU and the 
balancing of pro and anti-competitive effects in the application of Article 
101(3) TFEU 
Where the two extreme presumptions of legality or illegality do not apply under 
Article 101, a fuller competition law assessment will be required to determine whether 
(a) the agreement has as its effect the restriction of competition; and, if so, (b) whether 
it satisfies the conditions of Article 101(3).  
Since in Article 101(1) ‘effect’ cases a restriction of competition is not 
assumed, the likely impact of the agreement on inter- (and/or intra-) brand 
competition must be determined. Indeed, ever since 1966, and its judgment in Société 
Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH,
133
 the Court has recognised that 
agreements which do not have as their object the restriction of competition, should be 
assessed in their market context and an economic approach adopted when determining 
their effect. This position has been reiterated on many occasions. The Commission 
thus states in its Article 101(3) Guidelines that, in general, to establish that the 
agreement has as its effect the restriction of competition, a claimant will have to 
establish that it affects ‘actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the 
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relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality 
of goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability’.134  
Consequently, it is not sufficient to look at the contractual restraints in the 
agreement abstractly but they must be examined in the context in which they operate, 
encompassing an examination of the market shares and market power of the parties, 
the market context of the agreement and its effect on actual and potential 
competition.
135
 In ‘effect’ cases, therefore, an adverse effect on consumer welfare 
(and consumer interests) is only established where, compared to the situation which 
would occur in the absence of the agreement, the competitive process is distorted in 
such a way that negative effects on prices (or other parameters of competition) can be 
expected.  Whether such effects are probable is generally determined indirectly 
through an examination of the relevant market, the parties’ position in that market and 
the terms of the contract.
136
 The examination of the market thus focusses on likely, not 
actual, effects on consumers through negative effects on prices and other parameters 
of competition. Where such effects can be demonstrated the agreement will be 
prohibited unless the Article 101(3) legal exception applies: in particular, by 
establishing that consumers will benefit from other compensating efficiencies such as 
enhanced quality.
137
 
Unless the conditions of one of the block exemptions apply (see (iii) above), it 
is for those claiming the benefit of Article 101(3)
138
 to establish that all four
139
 of its 
criteria are satisfied:
140
 (1) that the agreement achieves benefits—improvements in the 
production or distribution of goods or the promotion of technical or economic 
progress; (2) that a fair share of those benefits are passed on to ‘consumers’; (3) that 
the agreement does not contain any indispensable restraints; and (4) that it does not 
eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
There is relatively little current jurisprudence providing clarification as to how these 
important criteria are interpreted. Consequently, the Commission’s Guidelines on 
Article 101(3)
141
 and other Notices also provide helpful guidance to business, 
shedding light on how the Commission interprets the criteria. When considering how 
Article 101(3) affects the ‘consumer’, several important observations can be made. 
First, the role of Article 101(3)
142
 is to determine whether benefits achieved by 
the agreement, or restrictive provisions, outweigh negative effects, so that the 
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agreement is on balance pro-competitive:
143
 that is, whether it achieves ‘appreciable 
objective advantages of such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages 
which they cause in the field of competition’.144 The Commission’s current view is 
that the parties must demonstrate efficiency gains (that is economic benefits, not 
public policy benefits unless they are used to supplement the economic benefits which 
the agreement generates), cost efficiencies,
145
 and qualitative efficiencies, creating 
value in the form of new or improved products (dynamic efficiencies),
146
 which will 
result from the economic activity that forms the object of the agreement (ie there is a 
causal link between the agreement and the claimed efficiencies)
147
 and that there is a 
pass-on of these efficiencies to consumers.
148
  
The Commission, reflecting the overarching consumer welfare goal, interprets 
the concept of the consumer broadly in this context to encompass: 
 
all direct or indirect users of the products covered by the agreement, including 
producers that use the products as an input, wholesalers, retailers and final 
consumers, ie natural persons who are acting for purposes which can be 
regarded as outside their trade or profession. In other words, consumers within 
the meaning of Article [101(3)] are the customers of the parties to the 
agreement and subsequent purchasers. These customers can be undertakings as 
in the case of buyers of industrial machinery or an input for further processing 
or final consumers as for instance in the case of buyers of impulse ice-cream 
or bicycles.
149
 
 
The consumer in Article 101(3), as a recipient of off-setting efficiencies, is thus 
equated with the consumer whose benefit is secured by the consumer welfare 
objective as a whole. For this reason, this is a different consumer from the one who is 
the subject of consumer protection law or who is one of the actors in the internal 
market case law.
150
 The final consumer may be a recipient of efficiencies but is not 
necessarily one of them or the only one. 
Second, it is clear that not all individual consumers need to derive a benefit 
from the agreement for Article 101(3) to apply. Rather, ‘it is the beneficial nature of 
the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets that must be taken into 
consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of consumers.’151 This 
approach detaches the analysis of the consumer benefit condition from the effects of 
an agreement on any individual consumer, or particular group of consumers. The 
emphasis is placed on the effect of the agreement on consumers overall. It is 
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significant that competition law bases this enquiry on factual considerations. By 
contrast, in other areas of EU law, legal constructs have been used to determine the 
parameters for the protection for consumers. For instance, the notion of the ‘average’ 
consumer has been widely used in free movement
152
 and consumer protection
153
 law 
to determine legal standards of protection, and often it has been construed in the light 
of the objectives that the law has tried to achieve. The average consumer has thus 
been identified in these areas as a ‘reasonably circumspect and well informed 
consumer’;154 consequently it is understood as embodying a highly competent 
consumer whose protection should interfere as little as possible with free trade and so 
trumps the more paternalistic national norms of consumer protection.
155
  
Third, ‘[t]he concept of ‘fair share’ implies that the pass-on of benefits must at 
least compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused to them 
by the restriction of competition found under Article [101(1)].’156 In other words, the 
net effect of the agreement must at least be neutral from the perspective of the 
consumers affected. A thorny issue in this context is whether the pass-on must 
compensate ‘those consumers directly or likely affected by the agreement’.157 
Although the view that all pro-competitive benefits in all markets should be relevant 
and weighed against the agreement’s anti-competitive effects gains some support 
from the Court, and, arguably, better accords with the overarching consumer welfare 
objective pursued,
158
 in a recent judgment the Court held, in the context of a two-
sided market (in which firms have to compete simultaneously for two groups of 
customers), that although the consumer benefits requirement relates to: 
 
the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets … 
in the case of a two-sided system … it is necessary to take into account … all 
the objective advantages … not only on the market in respect of which the 
restriction has been established, but also on the market which includes the 
other group of consumers associated with that system.
159
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However, benefits on one side of the market alone are not sufficient if the restrictive 
effects occur only on the other side and if the consumers in the two markets are not 
substantially the same. 
A broad reading of the cases also suggests that all consumer benefits, whether 
current or future, should be taken into account, so both the short- and long-term 
effects of the agreement may be relevant to the assessment. Indeed, the Commission’s 
Guidelines acknowledge that in assessing this overall impact, the efficiencies created 
by the agreement may only materialise in the future and that present loss to consumers 
may be compensated by future gain.
160
 Clearly, however, even if future benefits to 
future consumers are relevant, it may be extremely difficult for the parties to provide 
convincing evidence that such benefits will result to consumers.
161
 
 
(v) Abuse of a dominant position in Article 102 TFEU 
a. Exploitative conduct: ‘Unfair’ pricing and price discrimination 
An obvious objection to an undertaking holding a dominant position, or with market 
power, is its ability to ‘exploit’ its position and its customers and consumers in a way 
which would be impossible for an undertaking operating on a competitive market. 
Again, as was seen to be the case in the context of Article 101, the concern here is to 
prevent exploitation of a broad range of ‘consumers’, broadly encompassing those on 
the ‘buyer’ side of the market and not just final consumers.162 It is clearly the purpose 
of Article 102 to prevent such conduct as the provision refers specifically to ways in 
which market power may be exploited: for example, through ‘imposing unfair 
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions’ (Article 102(a)) or 
engaging in discriminatory behaviour, ‘applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage’ (Article 102(c)). Indeed, early on in the evolution of EU competition 
law it was questioned whether Article 102 went any further than protecting consumers 
from exploitation: whether it was only intended to forbid exploitative behaviour which 
harms consumers directly.163  
In 1972 in Continental Can, however, the Court, in a seminal judgment 
confirmed that Article 102 does not set out an exhaustive list of prohibited conduct164 
and that it can be applied to prohibit conduct affecting the structure of the market;165 it 
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applies to what are now referred to as ‘exclusionary’ abuses, as well as to exploitative 
ones, because such practices ‘cause consumers harm through their impact on 
competition’;166 by having the actual or potential effect of foreclosing the market, 
such practices harm consumer interests indirectly. The rationale for prohibiting 
exclusionary conduct is therefore that by protecting the competitive process,167 
automatic benefits to consumers will be delivered, especially in the long term.  
Indeed, something which might perhaps seem surprising to a consumer lawyer 
is that, following clarification from the Court that Article 102 applies to exclusionary 
conduct, most Article 102 competition law enforcement has focussed on such conduct. 
The Commission, like many other competition agencies, has rarely intervened in cases 
which purely involve ‘exploitative behaviour’. There is consequently a dearth of 
decisions and of guidance168 relating to behaviour that is directly exploitative of, and 
specifically targets,169 consumers.170  
In relation to ‘unfair pricing’ there may be several reasons for this 
recalcitrance on the part of competition agencies. First, any such intervention by a 
competition authority is extremely regulatory in nature and it is well known that there 
are acute difficulties involved in ascertaining when a price will be ‘excessive’—or as 
the Court explained, ‘one that has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product supplied’.171 In addition, it is also questionable whether intervention of this 
type is desirable because of its potential to have a negative effect on the competitive 
process—and consumers—in the long run.172 In the US, for example, the courts have 
been reluctant to condemn ‘monopoly’ power thrust upon a firm or achieved through 
superior skill, foresight and industry.173 On the contrary they have recognised that 
such market power provides the signal to attract new competition into the market174 
and a reward for innovation and the lawful winning of the competitive battle. In 
Verizon Communications v Law Offices of Curtis v Trinko LLP, Justice Scalia stated:  
 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a 
short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces 
risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the 
incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found 
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.
175
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Although, therefore, it may be accepted that such monopoly pricing harms customers 
of the dominant firm and consumers of their products in the short run (customers who 
do not value a product more than the cost of producing that product do not obtain it 
and static competition is reduced), it is accepted in the US that, in the long run, the 
conduct may make the market more competitive, by providing incentives both for 
innovation and new entry into the market.
176
 
In the EU, although ‘the [EEC] Founding Fathers’ faith in competition as a 
process of rivalry between competitors was not strong enough to tolerate 
customer/consumer exploitation in the short run’,177 there are nonetheless only 
relatively rare examples of Commission decisions concerning behaviour that had a 
direct impact on customers or final consumers: usually where the case has another 
dimension—an exclusionary or internal market aspect178 or where the interests of 
consumers cannot otherwise be ensured.
179
 A good example is the 1999 Commission 
decision about the 1998 FIFA World Cup,
180
 where the Commission investigated the 
arrangements relating to the sale of entry tickets to the 1998 FIFA World Cup. There, 
the Commission decided that the French body in charge of the organisation of the 
1998 World Cup had abused its position of dominance in limiting markets to the 
prejudice of consumers by discriminating against consumers outside France because 
the purchase of entry tickets was conditional on the provision of a postal address in 
France and telephone reservations could only be made within metropolitan France. In 
this case, and as well as the harm suffered by consumers, the commitment of the 
competition rules to the ideal of a single market where there is no direct or indirect 
discrimination against foreign products or foreign nationals can also be seen in action.  
Similarly, although price discrimination is specifically targeted by Article 102, if a 
consumer welfare objective is pursued there may be good reasons for being cautious 
about enforcing Article 102(c) in the way that its wording suggests. Price 
discrimination is a common occurrence in markets as suppliers seek, where possible, 
to extract from each consumer the maximum that they are willing to pay and to reflect 
the different demand sensitivities of consumers. Although price discrimination might 
harm consumers in some circumstances (for example, by allowing a dominant firm to 
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exclude competitors, to diminish consumer choice
181
 or to protect their dominant 
position and so damage the competitive process) where price discrimination is used as 
a mechanism to enable a firm to increase output by charging each customer its 
reservation price (and not to decrease output like other monopolistic practices),
182
 the 
practice may benefit consumers that might not otherwise have been able to purchase 
the product, even though it might harm traders by putting one at a disadvantage vis-à-
vis another. A problem inherent in Article 102(c) is that its wording does not seem to 
require ‘welfare losses’ but appears designed not only to prevent sellers from 
impairing the competitive position of competitors through price-cutting tactics 
(primary line injury), but to target the harm occasioned when competition is distorted 
between buyers and by favouring powerful buyers over smaller buyers without such 
effective buyer power (secondary line injury), whether or not such conduct is likely to 
harm consumers downstream. Article 102(c) has undoubtedly been relied upon and 
applied broadly by the Commission. In recent years, however, it has indicated that it 
will focus its resources on primary line injury, conduct which unlawfully excludes 
competitors and allows the dominant firm to acquire or strengthen its dominant 
position. Indeed, in its 2009 Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities the 
Commission only sets out its priorities in relation to exclusionary conduct and 
repeatedly emphasises that it will focus on the types of conduct that are most harmful 
to consumers.
183
 
 
b. Exclusionary conduct 
A majority of EU jurisprudence therefore focuses on exclusionary conduct which  
 
through recourse to methods different from that which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition.
184
  
 
The case law draws a vital distinction between competition on the basis of 
performance, or competition on the merits, and abusive exclusionary conduct. Where 
there is prima facie evidence of such exclusionary behaviour, the burden of 
demonstrating that the practice is objectively justified or that it produces efficiencies 
that ensure no net harm is likely to arise for consumers—and hence to show that 
Article 102 should not apply—will fall on the dominant company.185 Complexity is 
inherent in these assessments in distinguishing between unlawful exclusionary 
behaviour and legitimate competition
186
 and determining whether such conduct is 
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liable to harm consumer interests and in determining whether any justification for the 
conduct exists. 
The question of how to construct rules to identify and condemn exclusionary 
behaviour that harms competition and consumers and to differentiate it from 
competitive conduct in a way which is both sufficiently clear and accurate—so 
minimising both Type 1 and Type 2 errors—has proved a major challenge.187 The 
tendency in the EU has been for the distinction to be drawn through the use of 
conduct-specific tests. It has often been complained, however, that the EU authorities 
have been too ready to assume that conduct which may foreclose competitors and/or 
which may limit individual freedom or equality of opportunity between economic 
operators and their freedom to compete is abusive (without a need to demonstrate 
prejudice to consumers) and have consequently imposed too great a responsibility 
towards the competitive process on the shoulders of dominant firms and set the bar for 
establishing an abuse of Article 102 too low. In consequence, it has been argued that 
the tests drawn for identifying abuse may be over-inclusive, deterring dominant firms 
from engaging in aggressive and legitimate conduct, especially low price competition 
on the merits which might benefit consumers.
188
 Consequently, there is a risk that 
hardnosed competition, which may benefit consumers, may be deterred and less-
efficient competitors protected.  
The Commission has sought to meet this type of criticism by ‘modernising’ its 
approach to Article 102
189
 publishing first, in 2005, a DG Comp Staff Discussion 
Paper on the Application of Article 82 [102 TFEU] of the Treaty to Exclusionary 
Abuses
190
 and subsequently, in 2009, Guidance on its Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings (the ‘Guidance Paper’).191 The new approach set out in the Guidance 
Paper does not purport to contain a statement of the law (rather, at times it is in clear 
tension with it) but conveys the Commission’s determination to focus enforcement 
only on cases where the exclusionary conduct of the dominant firm impairs effective 
competition by ‘foreclosing their competitors in an anticompetitive way, thus having 
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an adverse impact on consumer welfare’;192 that is, to focus ‘on safeguarding the 
competitive process’ whilst being mindful of the fact ‘that what really matters is 
protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting competitors. 
This may well mean that competitors who deliver less to consumers in terms of price, 
choice, quality and innovation will leave the market’.193 
This is not an easy task, however, particularly in the area of pricing, where it is 
difficult to distinguish between aggressive competition through low pricing (which 
ordinarily benefits consumers and is promoted by competition law) and low pricing 
which unlawfully excludes competitors from the market and may damage consumers 
in the longer run. In determining whether low pricing by a dominant firm should be 
found abusive, relevant inquiries may be whether an equally efficient competitor
194
 
can compete (in particular, whether the dominant firm is pricing below its costs) and 
whether that conduct is liable to produce anticompetitive effects and harm consumers. 
Another important issue is whether, and if so when, presumptions of illegality should 
be used. It has been seen that in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires the Court of 
Justice stressed, in the context of Article 101, that the category of agreements 
restrictive of competition by object must be interpreted restrictively and applied only 
to situations where an agreement inherently reveals a ‘sufficient degree of harm to 
competition’.195  
In relation to Article 102, the Commission states in its Guidance Paper that 
anti-competitive effects do not need to be demonstrated in the case of conduct ‘that 
can only raise obstacles to competition and … creates no efficiencies’;196 such 
practices are, by their very nature, abusive unless the dominant firm can raise a valid 
objective justification for its conduct. In the context of pricing, the Court has held 
(recognising the relevance of the equally efficient competitor) that where a dominant 
firm engages in predatory pricing, pricing below its average variable costs (AVC), the 
abusive nature of such conduct is presumed, as the conduct has ‘no conceivable 
economic purpose other than the elimination of a competitor, since each item 
produced and sold entails a loss for the undertaking’.197 This presumption is arguably 
justifiable for if the dominant firm is not covering its variable costs it makes no sense 
for it to be selling extra units.
198
 
  In Post Danmark, the Court confirmed that, conversely, Article 102 does not 
prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on its own merits, a dominant position and 
does not seek to ensure that:  
 
competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position 
should stay on the market … Competition on the merits may, by definition, 
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lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors 
that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of 
view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.
199
 
 
Nonetheless, there are some circumstances in which EU condemns pricing practices 
even where it has not been established that they may exclude equally efficient 
competitors; for example, where the conduct is designed to ensure exclusivity, so 
tying customers to the dominant firm, limiting customer choice and restricting 
competitors’ access to the market.200 A controversial issue in this situation is, 
however, how a claimant must demonstrate that the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking is likely to exclude competition or damage the competitive structure in a 
way that is detrimental to consumers (that is to say, how must prejudice to consumers 
be demonstrated?) and in particular exactly when a presumption of anticompetitive 
effects can be relied upon.
201
 
Even where anticompetitive effects are not assumed proof of actual 
anticompetitive effect or a high probability that such an effect will arise is generally 
not required under Article 102 (as is the case in the context of Article 101). Rather, 
the anticompetitive effects of a dominant firm’s conduct tend to be presumed where 
proof of anticompetitive effects ‘which may potentially exclude competitors’202 and 
eliminate effective competition is demonstrated. Critics complain that this means that 
the interests of consumers under Article 102 are too remote. The judgments, however, 
appear to prefer a construction of Article 102 that will ensure that the process of 
competition and rivalry between firms is preserved and protected.
203
  
Third, like Article 101, Article 102 frequently requires a balance to be 
achieved between the protection of long- and short-term consumer interests.
204
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many of the leading judgments of the Court on exclusionary behaviour, the long-term 
effects on consumer interests play an important role.
205
 For example, in the context of 
predatory pricing, it has been seen that it is assumed that a dominant firm which 
prices its products so low that it is not even covering the marginal cost, or average 
variable cost, of producing that output commits an abuse of a dominant position. 
Although it might therefore seem peculiar for competition law to condemn low 
pricing, one of the very virtues it promotes, the conduct is prohibited as it is presumed 
that it will exclude equally efficient competitors from the market, deter competitors 
from entering the market and, after the predatory siege has ended, permit the 
dominant firm to raise prices and recoup the losses made. Conversely, in some cases 
competition law will not compel a dominant firm to engage in conduct which would 
increase competition in the short term (for example, to supply, or to continue to 
supply, a product which a competitor needs to compete) if, in the longer run, it might 
discourage innovation by the dominant firm or the competitor. 
 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMPETITION RULES AS A TOOL TO 
PROTECT CONSUMER INTERESTS AND GAPS AND LACUNAS 
The previous sections have considered the role that the consumer plays in framing the 
objectives of EU competition law and how those goals have shaped the interpretation 
of the substantive law. The goals are also crucial, however, to the question of how the 
laws should be enforced. Enforcement actions are, of course, necessary for the 
substantive law to be clarified and developed, and to ensure that the rules are effective 
and achieve their overarching objective—in particular, that consumers are protected 
by ensuring that violations are brought to an end, future violations are deterred and 
that consumers are compensated for any loss suffered as a consequence of 
infringements.
206
 Where a consumer welfare goal is adopted, therefore, important 
questions are: how should the interests of ‘consumers’, or particular groups of 
consumers, have an impact upon public enforcement (for example, in setting 
enforcement priorities of public enforcement agencies and in determining the role that 
consumers should play in public enforcement processes)? And should private 
enforcement, which involves, direct action by consumers to safeguard their own 
interests, be encouraged? The enforcement arena consequently provides an additional, 
and more practical, setting for determining how consumer interests should be 
protected and must, therefore, be referred to in this chapter. 
In the EU, although, historically, competition rules were enforced principally 
by the Commission, a more decentralised system has now emerged, involving a 
network of competition authorities: the European Competition Network, comprising 
the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs),
207
 and the courts and 
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tribunals of the individual Member States (the national courts). Consumers benefit 
both directly and indirectly from the interplay between these two levels of 
enforcement. Indeed, in the past few years important developments have taken place 
that are designed to put in place a more effective system of enforcement. These 
developments have yielded the image of a stronger and more empowered consumer.  
On the one hand, most competition law systems depend, to a greater or lesser 
extent, upon public enforcement. In the EU, the Commission and NCAs focus 
principally on ensuring that violations are brought to an end and deterred, not on 
ensuring compensation for victims;
208
 the Commission does not have power to award 
damages to those who have suffered loss, although it is seen below that it has been 
active in trying to facilitate private actions by victims for compensation. The 
questions of how competition agencies can best deter infringements, how public 
enforcement should be divided between the Commission and NCAs and how public 
enforcement relates to private enforcement are complex ones with their own rich body 
of literature. However, three important points are drawn out here.  
First, enforcement by the Commission follows an integrated administrative 
model;
209
 in proceedings under Articles 101 and/or 102 it acts, pursuant to powers 
conferred on it by Regulation 1/2003
210
 and Regulation 774/2003 (the Implementation 
Regulation),
211
 as an integrated decision-maker, deciding which cases to investigate, 
whether to initiate proceedings, whether an infringement has occurred and what 
sanctions should be imposed on undertakings in breach. A noteworthy feature of this 
process is that interested natural or legal persons that can show a ‘legitimate interest’ 
may take part in it in a number of ways: for example, by submitting complaints to the 
Commission,
212
 with the objective of triggering an investigation (the Commission is 
not obliged to act on a complaint, however, and may reject it if, following an 
examination, it decides that the case does not raise sufficient EU (or public) 
interest),
213
 or submitting observations in the course of the Commission 
proceedings.
214
 The modernisation reforms strengthened the role of complainants by 
encouraging them to inform the Commission about suspected infringements and, 
importantly, by clarifying the parameters that inform the submission of a complaint, 
as well as the procedural rights of the complainant. In particular, the 2004 
Commission Notice on the Handling of Complaints
215
 endorsed the view that not only 
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undertakings, trade and consumer associations
216
 but also individual consumers
217—
and here this term seems to be used as a synonym of final consumers—whose 
economic interests are directly and adversely affected by anti-competitive practices 
can be held to show a legitimate interest. This view, emphasising the position of final 
consumers as complainants that may set off the process of public enforcement of the 
Competition rules, has been upheld by the General Court in its case law. Indeed, in 
Österreichische Postsparkasse AG,
218
 the General Court affirmed the broad 
interpretation of those having a legitimate interest and confirmed that it extends to 
final consumers who can demonstrate that their economic interests have been harmed. 
It may be recalled that this judgment was controversial in terms of the discussion on 
the objectives of EU competition law because it was one of the few cases where the 
General Court adopted an interpretation favouring a narrow consumer welfare 
objective and thus adopted an approach that closely resembled the position taken by 
the Commission in the aftermath of the process of modernisation.
219
 Although later 
case law of the Court of Justice does not so clearly support this goal,
220
 the strong 
endorsement of the final consumer as a complainant that can trigger the Commission 
investigation remains entrenched in the case law. 
Second, not only does the Commission seek, when enforcing Articles 101 and 
102, to ensure that infringements are brought to an end, but it is intent on deterring the 
most serious violations of the competition law rules which cause widespread harm to 
consumer welfare (such as cartels and serious abuses of a dominant position
221
). To 
facilitate this, Regulation 1/2003 confers broad powers of investigation and 
enforcement upon the Commission, which are recognised by the case law,
222
 which it 
uses to ascertain the existence of potential violations of the EU competition rules. 
Furthermore, it confers power upon the Commission to: adopt decisions finding an 
infringement
223
 ; impose, subject to the principle of proportionality, remedies to 
ensure that the relevant undertakings bring the infringement to an end (through this 
issue of a cease and desist order and/or the imposition of other remedies); and fine 
undertakings that are found to be in breach of Articles 101 and 102, up to 10% of the 
undertaking’s turnover in the preceding year.224 The levels of fines—especially in 
relation to cartel activity
225—have been increasing steadily within this band, 
especially since the publication of the (current) 2006 Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines.
226
 Although these fines do not provide redress for consumers, the 
Commission action benefits consumers both by ensuring that that infringement is 
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brought to an end and through precluding future anti-competitive behaviour that might 
be harmful to them. Indeed, the Commission has stressed that the purpose of these 
fines is two-fold deterrence: both ‘specific’ deterrence—by sanctioning the 
undertakings in question—and ‘general’ deterrence—through deterring other 
undertakings from breaching the competition rules.
227
 In the cartel context, the 
Commission, like many other competition enforcement agencies around the world, 
has sought to deter cartel activity not only through increasing sanctions for those 
found to have been involved in such activity but by simultaneously utilising a 
leniency regime as an important anti-cartel enforcement tool which serves to 
destabilise cartels and to encourage a ‘race to confess’.228 Essentially, if certain 
conditions are fulfilled, the first undertaking to submit relevant evidence to the 
Commission is offered immunity and others that cooperate are offered the possibility 
of reduction in fines. 
Third, exactly how a competition authority uses its scarce resources to 
prioritise cases also has an important impact upon the question of which consumers 
are benefited. One of the concerns driving the introduction of a decentralised system 
of enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 was to allow the Commission to focus on the 
most serious violations of Competition law.
229
 Many competition authorities, 
including the Commission, devote significant resources to the detection and 
punishment of cartels. Often these relate to products, for example lysine or vitamins, 
which are not purchased by final consumers. Nonetheless, they cause harm to 
customers (such as farmers) who in turn may pass price increases down to 
consumers—so it is generally assumed that the harmful effects of such illegal price 
fixing cascade down to consumers. In some other cases, however, the Commission, 
NCAs (particularly those integrating consumer protection functions) and/or appeal 
courts, have shown in their decisional practice and judgments a direct focus on 
conduct which has an impact upon final consumers
230
 or particular groups of 
consumers, such as vulnerable consumers.
231
 
On the other hand, private civil actions may provide direct remedies to, and 
compensation for, victims of competition law infringements. They are therefore a 
mechanism for directly protecting consumers by allowing them to bring proceedings 
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which will result in infringements being brought to an end and/or reparation being 
provided for the harm that they have suffered as a result of anti-competitive practice. 
Furthermore, private litigation has an additional beneficial indirect effect on consumer 
interests by deterring future infringements and ensuring compliance with the 
competition rules.
232
 A number of important reforms have taken place over the past 
few years in the context of private enforcement with the objective of strengthening the 
position of the consumer as an enforcer of the EU Competition rules before the 
national courts.  
Early on in its jurisprudence, the Court recognised that Articles 101(1), 101(2) 
and 102 were directly effective, and hence could be enforced by private parties before 
the national courts.
233
 Despite this recognition, however, a very limited culture of 
private enforcement was prevalent, partly due to the centralised system of 
enforcement that applied before the enactment of Regulation 1/2003.
234
 Alongside the 
process of modernisation, the main impulse for the development of private 
enforcement of the EU rules followed from the decisions of the Court in Courage v 
Crehan
235
 and Manfredi,
236
 where the Court recognised that a private party that 
suffers harm as a result of anti-competitive behaviour has a right to compensation, as 
a matter of EU law. Although the volume of private litigation has begun to grow 
dramatically in some Member States, such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
the EU as a whole continues to present a stark contrast to the US where there is a 
culture of antitrust litigation and where a large proportion of competition cases are 
litigated privately.
237
 Indeed, because the procedural and substantive rules governing 
these claims are regulated by national law, private litigation is being hampered by a 
multiplicity of differing obstacles which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and by a 
lack of clarity over the question of what demands and constraints the EU law 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence impose on those national rules. For 
example, it is unclear whether the principles of effective judicial protection and of 
effectiveness of EU law, stressed in the Court’s Crehan and Manfredi judgments, 
requires that indirect purchasers (as well as direct purchasers) should have standing to 
bring antitrust proceedings and/or whether defendants should be able to raise a 
defence that a claimant should be denied recovery on the grounds that it has passed on 
an overcharge to its customers.  
The answer to this question would appear to depend on how the principle of 
effectiveness is to be interpreted and, specifically, whether it suggests that the 
principal purpose of private enforcement is the attainment of corrective justice, with 
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deterrence operating merely as a socially beneficial by-product of such actions, or 
whether private enforcement is simply a tool to increase enforcement, deter violations 
and punish violators.
238
 If the Court were to elevate the deterrent function of private 
enforcement higher than its ‘compensation function’ it might accept the compatibility 
with EU law of national rules which concentrate antitrust claims in the hands of those 
most likely to sue, for example, direct purchasers, and simplify antitrust actions for 
damages, for example, by precluding a passing on defence.
239
 Such an approach might 
ensure that strong incentives to sue
240
 are provided and that difficult issues of 
remoteness and tracing of injury are avoided. In contrast, if it were to elevate the 
compensation function over the deterrent one, it may require national law to ensure 
compensation to any claimant (whether a direct or indirect purchaser) who has 
suffered loss in consequence of anti-competitive activity and permit rules which deny 
recovery to claimants that have passed loss down the chain.  
In 2013, the Commission published a package of measures designed to remove 
this type of uncertainty and the principal obstacles to full compensation for antitrust 
victims and to ensure that private and public enforcement operate harmoniously 
together.
241
 This comprised the proposal of an EU Directive on Antitrust Damages 
actions,
242
 a Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress,
243
 and a Communication on the quantification of harm for 
damages.
244
 All of these initiatives indicate a new layer of protection of consumer 
interests at the level of enforcement. For instance, the Directive, which was adopted in 
November 2014 and has to be transposed by Member States into their national laws 
by 27 December 2016, emphasises the principle of full compensation for any natural 
or legal person who has suffered harm—even if they had not purchased directly from 
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the undertaking or undertakings infringing competition law.
245
 It also creates a 
rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm.
246
 Although the Directive does not 
attempt to adopt a complete harmonised framework, it incorporates provisions relating 
to: discovery (so claimants will have easier access to evidence); protection of leniency 
and settlement documents; joint and several liability (for any participant in an 
infringement subject to certain exceptions for recipients of immunity and small and 
medium sized enterprises); the effect of NCA decisions; establishment of clear 
limitation periods; the legal consequences of passing on (the Directive establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that indirect purchasers suffer some level of overcharge 
harm); and consensual dispute resolution.  
Likewise, the Commission hopes that the introduction of a set of common 
principles in the field of collective redress will help to ensure that effective 
compensation is obtained in mass harm situations; consequently, it might result in a 
more empowered consumer who is able, by joining claims with others, to get access 
to justice and pursue infringements of competition law, particularly where the cost of 
individual action may otherwise have acted as a deterrent.
247
 As however, the 
recommendation is that collective redress systems should, as a general rule, be based 
on the ‘opt-in’ principle (under which claimant parties are formed through directly 
expressed consent of their members), there is some concern that such classes will 
encompass only a small percentage of the antitrust victims.
248
  
Finally, the Commission’s guidance on quantifying harm is principally 
intended to bolster the effectiveness of the right to compensation.
249
 As former 
Commissioner Almunia explained, this new legislation seeks to ‘democratise’ 
enforcement by making damages actions more readily available to victims of anti-
competitive practices.
250
 The final consumer is clearly a prominent beneficiary of 
these initiatives alongside other victims of anti-competitive practices in the production 
and distribution chain.  
Private and public enforcement are thus closely connected. In particular, both 
systems work towards the protection of consumer interests and the empowerment of 
consumers. Public enforcement actions have a facilitating effect on private 
enforcement; a Commission decision finding a competition law infringement may be 
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relied upon to establish the existence of a breach
251
 and may provide evidence helpful 
in establishing causation and harm.
252
 Private actions can reinforce public 
enforcement by increasing deterrence by increasing the resources available for the 
prosecution of competition law infringements
253
 and filling any ‘enforcement gap’, 
and by increasing the likelihood of detection and increasing the cost of non-
compliance.  
Difficult decisions may have to be taken, however, where the interaction 
between the two enforcement systems becomes strained or where a conflict arises. For 
example, in Pfleiderer a tension arose between the need to ensure, on the one hand, 
the effectiveness of the right to compensation available to victims of anti-competitive 
practices and, on the other, the effectiveness of the leniency programmes, which are a 
crucial aspect of the public enforcement of the Commission in its fight against 
cartels.
254
 The key question in that case was whether a victim of a cartel pursuing an 
action for damages before the national court should be provided access to the file of 
the German competition authority that included documents provided by applicants for 
leniency. The Advocate General neatly explained the dichotomy arising in the case. 
On the one hand, he pointed to the need to ensure the efficiency of the EU leniency 
programmes. This would be undermined if self-incriminating documents that 
participants in a cartel submitted in their application for leniency were then 
communicated to victims of the cartel which would use them as a basis of actions for 
damages at national level.
255
 On the other, he referred to the right to compensation for 
harm suffered as a result of anti-competitive behaviour.
256
 In the context of ensuring 
the effectiveness of this right, the information provided by a leniency applicant could 
evidently help a third party in preparing an action for damages under Article 101.
257
 
The Advocate General then made a choice, according primacy to the EU interest in 
securing an effective public enforcement of competition policy and, indirectly, the 
common market objectives, over the interests of private claimants. Following this 
rationale, it would seem that the direct interests of specific consumers that are victims 
of anti-competitive practices could rank second to the effectiveness of the general 
system of public enforcement and the wider public interest. However, a more long-
term view of this approach is that the system of public enforcement indirectly benefits 
consumer interests as a whole by promoting general deterrence. The Court was more 
cautious than the Advocate General and left the balancing exercise between those two 
objectives to be performed by national courts on a case-by-case basis. Although the 
Court has since held that a total ban on disclosure is contrary to the principle of 
effectiveness in EU law,
258
 it again confirmed that it is for the national court to decide 
whether access should be granted or refused and the conditions that apply. In other 
words, the Court has not made a clear choice between the objectives of the leniency 
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programmes and the direct interests of individual consumers seeking compensation 
for the harm that they have suffered as a result of anti-competitive practices and thus 
has sent the implicit message that these two objectives are, in principle, equally 
important. The Directive, however, overrides this solution, providing that national 
courts must not order disclosure of leniency and settlement documents in national 
proceedings.  
Criticism may be levelled against some aspects of these recent reforms 
concerning private enforcement. For example, it could be argued that a bolder, more 
holistic approach should have been adopted in the Directive tackling a greater number 
of the areas of legal ambiguity that exist. Further, that because the Recommendation 
on collective redress takes the form of ‘soft law’ and recommends only systems based 
on the opt-in principle, the extent to which it will be able to bolster the position of the 
consumer is uncertain. However, overall, the consumer seems to have secured an 
increasingly prominent place in the context of the enforcement of the EU competition 
rules. Enforcement legislation and guidance documents refer more explicitly to the 
final consumer as an independent actor in EU competition law than in the context of 
the substantive law, and the initiatives briefly considered above suggest a strong trend 
towards the empowerment of the consumer in this field.  
One final important point to note, however, is that the EU competition rules 
cannot reach all conduct or features of a market, which result in the process of 
competition working sub-optimally so that it does not deliver to consumers products 
or services which represent the best value for money. Articles 101 and 102 and the 
EUMR target certain types of conduct of undertakings which distort the process of 
competition:
259
 anti-competitive agreements, mergers and unilateral conduct of 
dominant firms. It has been seen, however, that Article 102 does not provide an ideal 
mechanism for dealing with exploitative conduct of an undertaking which holds a 
dominant position in the market. In addition, standard ex post competition law may 
not be able to reach ‘tacit collusion’260 between undertakings operating on an 
oligopolistic market or easily deal with other structural problems that may arise on a 
market (for example, access to key infrastructure) or markets that fail because of 
blockages that occur on the demand side of the market. In such cases it may be 
features of the market other than the conduct targeted by these competition provisions 
which result in the market not operating efficiently. 
In such situations consumer law and regulation may play a role in filling the 
gaps that competition law cannot reach. Consumer law, for example, seeks to deal 
with some obstructions to the demand side of the market by striving to ensure that 
consumers have access to accurate information which they can act on and by 
protecting them against unfairness, deception or undue pressure. Regulation may plug 
any holes still left by competition and consumer law. Thus in some sectors, such as 
energy and telecommunications, for example, sophisticated regulatory regimes may 
be required, in particular, to ensure access to essential infrastructure and facilities and 
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 Broadly, tacit collusion occurs where undertakings operating on some oligopolistic markets, set their 
prices ‘as if’ there had been some explicit collusion between them. Oligopolists may recognise their 
interdependence and, without explicitly agreeing to do so, align their conduct and charge supra-
competitive prices as a rational response to market circumstances. Market conditions may therefore 
dictate that, without any communication between the undertakings, they align their behaviour in a 
manner which maximises the profits of the players involved but reduces efficiency and the welfare of 
consumers. 
  
to regulate the terms upon which access is given. Further, many jurisdictions confer 
broad powers upon competition agencies to conduct sector inquiries or market studies 
or investigations, in order to allow them to scrutinise closely markets that they believe 
may be malfunctioning and to discover the root cause.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The competitive process in a free market economy drives efficiency and delivers 
benefits to consumers by ensuring that the goods and services they receive represent 
the best value for money. One, if not the principal, goal of the competition rules is to 
ensure that markets operate efficiently so that the welfare of consumers is maximised. 
As a result, frequent references to ‘consumers’ and to ‘consumer welfare’ are found in 
the competition law context. Despite this, the exact meaning of these concepts has not 
been clearly elucidated in the legislation and the case law, suggesting that a more 
comprehensive attempt to clarify the position of the consumer in the framework of EU 
competition law is required. This article has, therefore, aimed to provide a taxonomy 
of those references and a more systematic analysis of the role of the ‘consumer’ and 
‘consumer interests’ in EU competition law. In doing so, it has considered the position 
of the consumer in three main contexts: in defining the objectives of EU competition 
law; in the application of the substantive rules; and in the enforcement of these rules. 
This section summarises the main findings of this chapter. 
There is, first of all, the primary question: who is the consumer referred to and 
protected by the competition rules? Unlike other areas of EU law, where the consumer 
is defined by the case law or legislation as a final user of goods and/or services (and 
different images of it are drawn such as the ‘average’ consumer or the ‘vulnerable’ 
consumer), the only comprehensive definition provided of the term ‘consumer’ in the 
competition law context, is that set out in the Commission Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3). There, the consumer is construed in very wide terms to 
encompass all direct and indirect users of a product, with the result that the interests 
of a broad contingent of economic actors (intermediate buyers, retailers, final 
consumers, etc) are included. This definition accords with the Commission’s view that 
the overarching objective of the rules is to protect competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources. This understanding of the objectives of competition law has proved to be a 
key issue in ascertaining the role of the consumer in EU competition law. Although 
the Commission’s view that consumer welfare is the cornerstone of EU competition 
law has not been endorsed by the Court, it is generally accepted that ‘consumer 
welfare’ is at least one important objective of competition law. In addition, it seems 
clear that, although this term has been assigned a variety of meanings—ranging from 
narrow notions of consumer surplus, to broad ones equated with ‘total’ or ‘societal’ 
welfare—both the Commission and the wording of the TFEU seem to support the 
narrower definition of consumer welfare.  
It has also been seen that pursuit of a consumer welfare objective may require 
trade-offs between different groups of consumers to be made as it concentrates on the 
maximisation of the welfare of consumers as a whole. Thus, despite Commission 
rhetoric which emphasises the position of the final consumer as the key beneficiary of 
the competition rules, the protection of the interests of final consumers, who are the 
essential consideration in other areas of EU law such as consumer law or internal 
market law (when consumer protection is invoked as a derogation to the provisions on 
  
free movement), is just one element that is taken into account. Rather, competition 
law seeks to protect their interests by ensuring that competition is not distorted, in 
particular by cartels, anti-competitive mergers and the unlawful exclusionary conduct 
of dominant firms, and assumes that the benefits of competitive markets will cascade 
down to them.  
This chapter has established that it is this broad perception of the ‘consumer’ 
that is used implicitly in many cases involving the application of the substantive 
competition rules and that this conclusion is not undermined by some examples of 
narrower images of the consumer being drawn. Rather, in most cases where a 
narrower definition of the consumer is adopted, the consumer identified is simply one 
playing a part in the more detailed analytical process of considering whether the 
competition laws apply or have been infringed: for instance, in the determination of 
the relevant product market or as a reference point in determining how particular 
groups of consumers have been or may be affected by particular conduct and 
consequently whether a restriction of competition or an abuse of dominant position 
has been committed. Thus, in spite of an apparent diversity of images of the 
consumer, it has been argued that the term ‘consumer’ is a chameleonic concept 
which simply adapts to the (competition law) context in which it is used.  
To the inherently nebulous view of the objectives of competition law, more 
uncertainty is added by the use of assumptions, presumptions and indirect assessment 
to test the legality of market behaviour rather than an actual determination of harm. 
The focus of the analysis tends to be in the identification of behaviour that is 
detrimental to competition itself. Further, a competition law system may sometimes 
decline to condemn behaviour which harms consumers in the short term (for example, 
exploitative behaviour) in order to protect competition which, in turn, will deliver 
long-term benefits to consumers. Conversely, there may be behaviour (for example, 
predatory pricing) that may be prohibited even if it promotes consumer interests in the 
short term if it will damage the competitive process in the longer-run. The result is 
that the long-term and short-term interests of consumers must be weighed, and that 
the latter might be preferred where they coincide more easily with the benefits that the 
competitive process is supposed to deliver. It seems, therefore, that both in terms of 
the objectives and of the application of the Competition rules, these rules are applied 
not to protect directly or come to the aid of final consumers but on the premise that 
these consumers will draw indirect benefits from the protection of the process of 
competition. This analytical process, based upon legal presumptions and the 
assumption of long-term benefits, suggests a degree of remoteness from final 
consumer interests.  
In contrast with the uncertainties that surround the application of the 
substantive rules, the consumer has seen a strengthening of its position in the context 
of the enforcement of the competition rules. The recent reforms, both in the field of 
the public and private enforcement of Articles 101 and 102, have developed and 
fortified avenues and mechanisms for the consumer to be able to defend their interests 
in the face of anti-competitive behaviour. Here, the final consumer has begun to 
emerge as an actor in its own right and as part of the drive to ensure the effectiveness 
of the substantive rules.  
Ultimately, competition law is enforced to promote the process of competition, 
with the understanding that this will, in turn, deliver benefits to consumers. 
Consumers are therefore shown a ‘promised land’ that will take some time to be 
reached. As far as final consumers—and what they can expect from competition 
  
law—are concerned, the way in which the competition rules are applied conjures up 
the image of a house of cards, intricately built but without a thoroughly solid 
foundation. The fact that strong mechanisms of enforcement have been developed to 
ensure that consumers can take action in cases where there has been a breach of the 
competition rules is a welcome move, but it does not make up for the fact that the 
actual role of consumer interests in substantive assessments is far from clear. Whether 
this lack of clarity can be sustained today is questionable, particularly given the 
obligations imposed by Article 12 TFEU and Article 38 of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Human Rights. However, the full implications of these provisions for 
EU competition law remain to be seen.  
